Book Project
Beyond the Rubicon: Command and Control in Regional Nuclear Powers
What factors explain the origins of command and control systems in emerging nuclear powers? Why do some states implement robust physical, technical, and administrative controls over their nuclear arsenals, while others limit safeguards against accidental and unauthorized nuclear use?
I propose a theoretical framework that incorporates three variables to predict a state's command and control arrangements: first, the presence of a proximate and conventionally superior adversary; second, the severity of domestic threats to the survival of the political regime; and third, the degree of military organizational autonomy. This framework generates determinate predictions for command and control systems in regional nuclear powers and specifies the conditions under which each factor shapes command and control arrangements.
I evaluate my argument with a combination of archival, historical, and original interview data with political and military elites in India, Pakistan, apartheid-era South Africa, and the United Kingdom.
Works in Progress
"Set to Fail? The Origins of Command and Control in Regional Nuclear Powers"
"Civil-Military Stability and Nuclear Platform Diversification"
"The Adoption of Nuclear Arsenal Innovations" (with Kyungwon Suh)
"Command and Control in New Nuclear States" (with Peter D. Feaver)
Beyond the Rubicon: Command and Control in Regional Nuclear Powers
What factors explain the origins of command and control systems in emerging nuclear powers? Why do some states implement robust physical, technical, and administrative controls over their nuclear arsenals, while others limit safeguards against accidental and unauthorized nuclear use?
I propose a theoretical framework that incorporates three variables to predict a state's command and control arrangements: first, the presence of a proximate and conventionally superior adversary; second, the severity of domestic threats to the survival of the political regime; and third, the degree of military organizational autonomy. This framework generates determinate predictions for command and control systems in regional nuclear powers and specifies the conditions under which each factor shapes command and control arrangements.
I evaluate my argument with a combination of archival, historical, and original interview data with political and military elites in India, Pakistan, apartheid-era South Africa, and the United Kingdom.
Works in Progress
"Set to Fail? The Origins of Command and Control in Regional Nuclear Powers"
"Civil-Military Stability and Nuclear Platform Diversification"
"The Adoption of Nuclear Arsenal Innovations" (with Kyungwon Suh)
"Command and Control in New Nuclear States" (with Peter D. Feaver)
