Dissertation
Beyond the Rubicon: Command and Control in Regional Nuclear Powers
What factors explain the origins of command and control systems in emerging nuclear powers? Why do some states implement robust physical, technical, and administrative controls over their nuclear arsenals, while others limit safeguards against accidental and unauthorized nuclear use?Despite the crucial role of these systems in maintaining nuclear stability and security, researchers are yet to provide an empirically based account of the origins of command and control in emerging nuclear nations.
I propose a theoretical framework that incorporates three variables to predict a state's command and control arrangements: first, the presence of a proximate and conventionally superior adversary; second, the severity of domestic threats to the survival of the political regime; and third, the degree of military organizational autonomy. This framework generates determinate predictions for command and control systems in emerging nuclear nations and specifies the conditions under which each factor shapes command and control arrangements.
I evaluate my argument with evidence from India, Pakistan, South Africa, and France, drawing upon a combination of archival, historical, and original interview data with political and military elites in India, Pakistan, and apartheid-era South Africa.
Works in Progress
"Set to Fail? The Origins of Command and Control in Regional Nuclear Powers"
"Nuclear Launch Authority: Comparative Lessons and Current Doctrine"
- Research report commissioned by The Tobin Project
"Civil-Military Stability and Nuclear Platform Diversification"
"The Diffusion of Nuclear Innovations" (with Kyungwon Suh)
Beyond the Rubicon: Command and Control in Regional Nuclear Powers
What factors explain the origins of command and control systems in emerging nuclear powers? Why do some states implement robust physical, technical, and administrative controls over their nuclear arsenals, while others limit safeguards against accidental and unauthorized nuclear use?Despite the crucial role of these systems in maintaining nuclear stability and security, researchers are yet to provide an empirically based account of the origins of command and control in emerging nuclear nations.
I propose a theoretical framework that incorporates three variables to predict a state's command and control arrangements: first, the presence of a proximate and conventionally superior adversary; second, the severity of domestic threats to the survival of the political regime; and third, the degree of military organizational autonomy. This framework generates determinate predictions for command and control systems in emerging nuclear nations and specifies the conditions under which each factor shapes command and control arrangements.
I evaluate my argument with evidence from India, Pakistan, South Africa, and France, drawing upon a combination of archival, historical, and original interview data with political and military elites in India, Pakistan, and apartheid-era South Africa.
Works in Progress
"Set to Fail? The Origins of Command and Control in Regional Nuclear Powers"
"Nuclear Launch Authority: Comparative Lessons and Current Doctrine"
- Research report commissioned by The Tobin Project
"Civil-Military Stability and Nuclear Platform Diversification"
"The Diffusion of Nuclear Innovations" (with Kyungwon Suh)
