Dissertation
Beyond the Rubicon: Command and Control in Regional Nuclear Powers
What factors explain the origins of command and control systems in regional nuclear powers? Why do some states implement robust physical, technical, and administrative controls over their nuclear arsenals, while others limit safeguards against accidental and unauthorized nuclear use?Despite the crucial role of these systems in maintaining nuclear stability and security, researchers are yet to provide an empirically based account of the origins of command and control in emerging nuclear nations.
I propose an explanation of regional nuclear power command and control rooted in organizational politics and civil-military relations. I argue that the level of military influence in politics offers significant leverage for explaining command and control outcomes. As military organizations become more politically influential, the military’s organizational interests and biases manifest in looser patterns of control that favor responsiveness, but risk unwanted use. Furthermore, in contrast to theories that view civilians as virtuous adherents to balance of power considerations, I argue that civilian control over nuclear decisions results in tighter political control that maintains the ruling regime’s dominance of the program, often in contradiction to systemic imperatives. Finally, because command and control institutions create distributional consequences that advance actors’ interests, civilian and military groups compete to consolidate their influence over nuclear management operations, while also excluding interference from competing political actors.
I evaluate my argument with evidence from South Africa, Pakistan, and India, using a combination of original interview data with political and military elites, archival documents, and historical material.
Works in Progress
"Set to Fail? The Origins of Command and Control in Regional Nuclear Powers"
"Civil-Military Stability and Nuclear Platform Diversification"
Beyond the Rubicon: Command and Control in Regional Nuclear Powers
What factors explain the origins of command and control systems in regional nuclear powers? Why do some states implement robust physical, technical, and administrative controls over their nuclear arsenals, while others limit safeguards against accidental and unauthorized nuclear use?Despite the crucial role of these systems in maintaining nuclear stability and security, researchers are yet to provide an empirically based account of the origins of command and control in emerging nuclear nations.
I propose an explanation of regional nuclear power command and control rooted in organizational politics and civil-military relations. I argue that the level of military influence in politics offers significant leverage for explaining command and control outcomes. As military organizations become more politically influential, the military’s organizational interests and biases manifest in looser patterns of control that favor responsiveness, but risk unwanted use. Furthermore, in contrast to theories that view civilians as virtuous adherents to balance of power considerations, I argue that civilian control over nuclear decisions results in tighter political control that maintains the ruling regime’s dominance of the program, often in contradiction to systemic imperatives. Finally, because command and control institutions create distributional consequences that advance actors’ interests, civilian and military groups compete to consolidate their influence over nuclear management operations, while also excluding interference from competing political actors.
I evaluate my argument with evidence from South Africa, Pakistan, and India, using a combination of original interview data with political and military elites, archival documents, and historical material.
Works in Progress
"Set to Fail? The Origins of Command and Control in Regional Nuclear Powers"
"Civil-Military Stability and Nuclear Platform Diversification"
